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INFRINGING A FANTASY: FUTURE OBSTACLES ARISE FOR
THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE AND SOFTWARE
MANUFACTURERS UTILIZING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The future of the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency
of industry, and the efficiency of industry depends in no small
part on the protection of intellectual property.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet and revolutionary advances
in personal computers and gaming software were considered some
of the most significant advances in the technology of the twentieth
century.2 The Internet enables people around the world to experi-
ence events and cultures in a way never before imaginable.3 With
the click of a mouse, a single mother can share with her children an
adventure in the pyramids of Egypt from her personal computer.4
In a single keystroke, a man in a wheelchair can explore, at the
speed of light, the solar system, the galaxy, and beyond. 5 Likewise,
people can play fantasy games on the Internet, linking them to
worlds only imaginable in the minds of children. 6
1. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991).
2. See 20th Century Technology, at http://www.time.com/time/timel00/
builder/tech-supp/tech-supp/ai.html (on file with author) (last visited Oct. 6,
2003) (selecting personal computer and Internet as leading innovations of twenti-
eth century). Also included on the list of top twenty advances of the twentieth
century were: automobiles, radio, television, transistors, lasers, airplanes, plastics,
and artificial intelligence. See id. (listing selected inventions).
3. See Dexter M. Campbell, III, Internet Law - Surfing Without a Board? A Look at
Copyright Infringement on the Internet and Article I of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 279, 280-81 (2002) (discussing history and use of In-
ternet). For a discussion of the history of the Internet, see infra note 28 and ac-
companying text.
4. See Guardian's Egypt: Tour the Pyramids of Egypt, at http://www.guardians.
net/egypt/pyramids/tourthe-pyramids.htm (last modified June 23, 2003) (pro-
viding users color photos, tours, and information on Egypt's most fascinating
pyramids).
5. See http://www.space.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (enabling users to view
photographs and learn more about galaxies, solar systems, comets, and asteroids).
6. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Amazing Video Game Boom: Kid Stuff Has Become
Serious Business as Hollywood and Silicon Valley Race to Attract a New Generation to the
Information Highway, TmE, Sept. 27, 1993, at 67-68 (describing children being lost
in make-believe world of video games); Gamespot, at http://gamespot.com/game
spot/filters/0,10850,6013548,00.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) (providing
graphic previews for wide variety of video games); see alsoJ-N. Sbranti, Organizing
(173)
1
Schaal: Infringing a Fantasy: Future Obstacles Arise for the United State
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
174 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Fantasy sports leagues are one of a variety of outlets available to
users who want the experience of managing a professional sports
team.7 The popularity of fantasy sports increased tremendously
upon being introduced online.8 Today, managing fantasy sports
teams has never been more efficient because of computers,
software, and the Internet. 9 In fact, fantasy sports have even ex-
panded to pay-per-view television due to popularity online. 10 An
estimated fifteen million people currently play fantasy sports, offer-
ing enormous economic opportunity for fantasy sports providers.11
Recently, in Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc.
("Fantasy"),12 major fantasy sports providers came under fire in a
Leagues Grows Easier Thanks to Web, ScviuPs HowARD NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 31, 2001, at
3 (listing various Internet sites offering fantasy sports). Some Internet sites that
provide fantasy sports games include: AllStar Stats (allstarstats.com), Fantasy Com-
missioner Web (webleaguemanager.com), Fantasy Sports LLC (fantasysportsllc.
com), My Fantasy League.com (myfantasyleague.com), National Football League
(fantasy.nfl.com), MVP Fantasy Sports (fantasymvp.com), RealTime Fantasy Sports
(rtsports.com), CBS SportsLine.com (fantasy.sportsline.com), Super Spuds Fun
Fantasy Football Manager (flbmanager.com) and Yahoo! (fantasysports.yahoo.
com).
7. See Mike Spofford, More than Just a Game: They're Fantasy Sports, GREEN BAY
PREss-GAZETTE, Feb. 11, 2002, at 2C (stating fantasy sports leagues are national
phenomenon). The advent of fantasy sports on the Internet created markets for
fantasy sports magazines and numerous Internet sites. See id. (commenting In-
ternet expanded to markets outside of Internet). The explosion in popularity in
the 1980s and 1990s now encompasses sports from baseball to auto racing. See
Michael J. Thompson, Give Me $25 on Red and Derek Jeter for $26: Do Fantasy Sports
Leagues Constitute Gambling?, 8 SPORTS LAw. J. 21, 22 (2001) (discussing rise in pop-
ularity of fantasy sports on Internet).
8. See Nicole Davidson, Internet Gambling: Should Fantasy Sports Leagues Be Pro-
hibited, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 202 (2002) (noting fantasy sports on Internet
increased availability of and access to fantasy leagues).
9. See Sbranti, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining before fantasy sports enthusiasts
used computers, league commissioners worked many hours each week to tally
points by hand). Today, the Internet and fantasy Web sites provide an "endless
flow of customized statistics." Id.
10. See Announcing First-Ever Fantasy Football Sports Draft Party Pay-Per-View Event,
CONUS COMM., at http://web.archive.org/web/20020805011925/http://biz.
yahoo.com/prnews/020724/mnwOl2_2.html (July 24, 2002) (advertising first ever
pay-per-view television event for fantasy sports).
11. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 23 (citing estimate of Carl Foster, Presi-
dent of Fantasy Sports Players Association). SportsLine.com, one of the many
providers of Internet fantasy sports, reported that its revenues from advertising in
one quarter alone were $20.9 million. See Christine Winter, Sticky Situations: To
Attract Advertising and Improve Their Chances for Survival, Web Sites Must Make Sure
Visitors Stay Longer and Keep Coming Back, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 1,
2001, at 12 (announcing SportsLine.com's fantasy participants increased from
150,000 to 1.7 million in one year). Many providers create revenue by selling sub-
scriptions to their leagues. See Sbranti, supra note 6, at 3 (listing entrance fees for
online providers of fantasy sports).
12. 287 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 11: p. 173
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lawsuit alleging patent infringement. 13 In an analysis of whether
competitors' Internet sites and computer programs infringed the
plaintiff's patent, the Federal Circuit addressed whether a com-
puter program infringes if the software has the capability to in-
fringe.' 4 Following a direct infringement analysis, the court, in
accordance with its decision in Intel Corp. v. United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission ("Intefl),15 held that, in order to find in-
fringement, "the code underlying an accused fantasy football game
must be written in such a way as to enable a user of that software to
utilize [the software in an infringing manner], without having to
modify [the] code."' 6
To the contrary, the Federal Circuit, in High Tech Medical In-
strumentation, Inc. v. New Image Industries, Inc. ("High Tech") ,17 ruled
a device does not infringe "simply because it is possible to alter it in
a way that would satisfy all the limitations of a patent claim." 18
13. See id. at 1112 (stating Fantasy Sports filed suit against SportsLine.com,
Inc., Yahoo! Inc., and ESPN/Starwave Partners for infringing U.S. Patent
4,918,603); see also W. Scott Petty, Internet Patent Lawsuits Multiply as E-Commerce
Revenues Soar, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 2000, at 46 (noting patent owner com-
menced lawsuit after license negotiations failed). See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000)
("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented in-
vention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."). Patent
infringement is "[t] he unauthorized making, using, offering to sell, selling, or im-
porting into the United States any patented invention." BLACK'S LAw DicriONARY
785 (7th ed. 1999) (defining patent infringement).
14. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1117 (questioning whether product directly in-
fringes when simply capable of infringing). In this Comment, the terms "software"
and "computer program" are used interchangeably.
15. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the facts and holding in
Intel, see infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
16. Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1118. The Federal Circuit remanded the case to de-
termine whether, under a direct infringement analysis, SportsLine's product in-
fringed Fantasy's patent. See id. at 1119 (questioning whether kicker received
bonus points for out-of-position scoring).
17. 49 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
18. Id. at 1555 (citing Hap Corp. v. Heyman Mfg. Co., 311 F.2d 839, 843 (1st
Cir. 1962)). The District Court for the Southern District of New York went one
step further and said there is "no infringement unless... [the device] infringes as
it is intended to be played when sold." Marvin Glass & Assocs. v. De Luxe Topper
Corp., 284 F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (citing Kaz Mfg. Co. v. Chesebrough-
Pond's, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)). In Marvin, the plaintiff, owner of
the license for the board game Mouse Trap, sued the defendant manufacturer of
Silly Safari for patent infringement. See id. at 559 (stating suit was brought against
Silly Safari owner for patent infringement). The court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff did not establish infringement liter-
ally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See id. at 562 (demonstrating direct in-
fringement must be established either literally or through doctrine of equivalents).
For a further discussion of the facts in High Tech, see infra notes 98-106 and accom-
panying text.
2004]
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Thus, Fantasy, Intel, and High Tech represent opposing rules of law
that mark each end of the spectrum in a direct infringement analy-
sis. Importantly, though, the more difficult case ("Hard Case") lies
in between these rules of law where not the programmer, but rather
an advanced computer program and its user, create the capability
to infringe. 19 How would the Federal Circuit rule if the computer
program, rather than the programmer, caused the product to
infringe?20
This Comment examines the situation where a "Choose Your
Own Adventure" program and the user stumble upon a scenario
that infringes a protected patent.2 1 Section II introduces the theory
behind artificial intelligence and patents, discussing the seminal
patent decisions of the courts and reviewing the facts of the "Hard
Case."2 2 Section III analyzes how courts should decide a situation
that falls between the decisions of Intel, Fantasy, and High Tech be-
cause a software program incorporates artificial intelligence. 23 Sec-
tion IV delineates the possible repercussions of a court ruling for or
against a software program enabled with artificial intelligence. 24 Fi-
nally, Section V concludes with a discussion concerning the future
growth of technology and the patent system. 25
19. For a discussion of a more difficult case [hereinafter "Hard Case"] con-
cerning an advanced software program that incorporates artificial intelligence, see
infra notes 134-83 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DoRR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE
SECRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS §§ 8.10-13 (2d ed. 1995) (indi-
cating future litigation will determine whether material created by creative
software will be protected by courts). For a discussion of the "Hard Case" concern-
ing an advanced software program enabled with artificial intelligence, see infra
notes 134-83 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the hypothetical "Hard Case," see infra notes 134-83
and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of artificial intelligence, patent infringement, or the semi-
nal cases concerning patent infringement in computer software, see infra notes 26-
133 and accompanying text.
23. For an analysis of the "Hard Case," see infra notes 134-83 and accompany-
ing text.
24. For a discussion of the possible impact concerning a patent infringement
decision of a computer program enabled with artificial intelligence, see infra notes
184-97 and accompanying text.
25. For a conclusion concerning the current law and its relation to future
technology, see infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11: p. 173
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to Artificial Intelligence
The creation of computers revolutionized invention.26 The
technology contained within a small microchip allowed for new and
previously unimaginable worlds to be discovered and conquered. 27
The advancement of the Internet sparked the interest of a new gen-
eration of computer users.28 As computer technology grew, ad-
vances in programming and circuitry not only enabled the
programmer, but also the computer, to advance the machine's
utility. 29
Artificial intelligence is "the study of mental faculties through
the use of computational models. °30 Potential applications are
widespread; from military operations to the entertainment industry
to computer games.3 1 Consequently, computers utilizing artificial
intelligence can create virtual worlds and characters that dynami-
cally interact with the user.3 2 In particular, computer games with
26. See Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Patentability of Computer Programs, 6
A.L.R. FED. 156, 158 (1971) (stating ability of computer to perform time-consum-
ing task instantaneously revolutionized U.S. economy).
27. See Bowser's Castle: Super Mario 3, at http://www.jbush27.freeserve.co.uk/
SMB3.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003) (explaining how Super Mario Brothers be-
came one of largest selling games in world).
28. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 280-81 (discussing history and use of In-
ternet). The Internet first came into existence in 1969 when the government
tested its Advanced Research Projects Agency Network ("ARPANET"), a network
linking military defense contractors and university computers for research pur-
poses. See id. at 280 (discussing origins of current Internet). The Internet, a deriv-
ative of ARPANET, later became popular with household computer users when
domain names, servers, the World Wide Web ("WWW"), and graphical interfaces
came into existence. See id. at 280-81 (stating increase in use of Internet based on
utilities making Internet more user-friendly). According to the latest census from
August 2000, forty-four million households have at least one member using the
Internet. See id. at 281 (citing Eric C. Newburger, Home Computers and the Internet in
the United States: August 2000, United States Census Bureau, at http://www.census.
gov). E-mail, research, reading news, weather, sports and performing job-related
tasks are some of the reported uses of the Internet. See id. (listing various uses of
Internet).
29. See An Introduction to the Science of Artificial Intelligence, at http://library.
thinkquest.org/2705/ (last modified June 21, 1997) (reviewing history, headlines
of artificial intelligence, and ability of computers to mimic human thought).
30. EUGENE CHARNIAK & DREw MCDERMOTT, INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL IN.
TELLIGENCE 6 (Mark S. Dalton et al. ed., 1987); see also PATRICK HENRY WINSTON,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1 (2d ed. 1984) (defining artificial intelligence as "the
study of ideas that enable computers to be intelligent").
31. See Artificial Intelligence Plain and Simple, at http://ai-depot.com (last visited
Oct. 6, 2003) (summarizing advances in artificial intelligence technology and
where to look for uses).
32. SeeJohn E. Laird & Michael van Lent, Human-Level Al's Killer Application:
Interactive Computer Games, Al MAC., Summer 2001, at 15 (introducing capability of
2004]
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artificial intelligence capabilities can expand the length and en-
tertainment value of a game. 33 One commentator posits, "[o] ne of
the Holy Grails of interactive fiction is to have a computer director
who can dynamically adjust the story and plot based on the actions
of the human." 34 Games like Midway's NFL Blitz and Valve
Software's Half-Life are beginning to incorporate artificial intelli-
gence into their programming.3 5
Because of the incorporation of artificial intelligence into
software and the relatively recent ruling by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO") permitting patents on computer
software, significant changes are occurring throughout the software
industry.3 6 In the 1950s and early 1960s, the growth of the com-
puter industry prompted software manufacturers to seek out pat-
ents for their products. 37 The Patent Office, however, uniformly
artificial intelligence to create interactive computer games), available at http://
www.kddresearch.org/Groups/AI-CBR/Papers/Interactive-computer-games-
AIMag22-02-003.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
33. See id. (revealing games with artificial intelligence may introduce new
characters that have knowledge and think independently).
34. Id. at 20. Currently, most games have fixed scripts and fixed endings,
however, games, such as Blade Runner, incorporated autonomy into the program.
See id. at 23 (noting advances in computer games).
35. SeeJames Hansen & Scott Susslin, Artificial Intelligence in Computer Games, at
http://shakti.trincoll.edu/-ssusslin/gameAl.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (intro-
ducing scope and possible future of artificial intelligence). "In Midway's NFL
Blitz, computer opponents" use artificial intelligence to learn from human inputs
and counteract through the use of different defenses. Id. (describing some uses of
artificial intelligence in current computer software). "If [the computer program]
notices that you use certain plays or certain types of plays fairly regularly, [the
program] will start to employ the corresponding defensive sets to stop you." Id.
Additionally, in Valve Software's Half-Life, enemies exhibit flanking maneuvers
regularly used by animals and are concerned for their self-preservation, meaning
the creature may retreat to gain strength or help. See id. (describing capability of
artificial intelligence to create simulated animal and human characteristics in
game characters).
36. SeeJames Gleick, Patently Absurd: Once the Province of a Nuts-and-Bolts World,
Patents Are Now Being Applied to Thoughts and Ideas in Cyberspace. It's a Ridiculous
Phenomenon, and It Could Kill E-Commerce, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 46
("Each of these [software] patents is a tiny masterpiece of logic and disputation.
Each represents, by definition, a restraint on trade, a layer of regulation, expensive
overhead in the free-market economy. The exclusive fights conveyed by a patent
automatically translate into higher prices for consumers somewhere along the
chain."); see also Tim Bajarin, It Was 20 Years Ago... : Two Decades Ago, IBM's PC
Brought the Computer to the Masses, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/
DailyNews/SILICONINSIGHTSBAJARIN_010809.html (Aug. 9, 2001) (depict-
ing timeline of computer evolution and change in past twenty years); Robert Le-
mos, Patents, Lawsuits Plague the Net, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-519590.
html (Mar. 30, 2000) ('Software has advanced much more because of competition
than because of fencing things off.').
37. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL AGE 1007 (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing history of software patents).
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rejected attempts by manufacturers to gain patents for software,
claiming software was not patentable subject material. 38 Despite a
large wave of protest, the Supreme Court opened the floodgates for
software manufacturers to obtain patents with its ruling in Diamond
v. Diehr ("Diamond") .39 As a result of Diamond and subsequent deci-
sions, Computers Systems Class 395, a unique type of patent appli-
cation class, rose from 3,829 filings in 1988 to 7,552 filings in 1992
with United States patents issued in this class doubling over a five-
year period.40
Manufacturers of software technology increasingly attempt to
obtain patent protection for their products. 41 Software programs
must still be useful, novel, non-obvious, and clearly described in a
patent application before a patent is granted.42 With manufactur-
ers attempting to gain patents for their software, many scholars be-
lieve that a flood of litigation involving software patents is on the
horizon.43
B. Introduction to Patent Infringement
The Founding Fathers created the United States patent system
in an effort to promote invention while giving an inventor the "in-
trinsic right.., to profit from [an] invention [ that was] recognized
38. See id. (noting some manufacturers obtained patents for their products,
but not for software per se).
39. 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (stating patents for software were historically not
allowed).
40. See DoPR, supra note 20, at § 8.10 (stating patents for software were histori-
cally not allowed, however, Supreme Court opened door in Diamond v. Diehr);
Michael Guntersdorfer, Software Patents: What One-Click Buy and Safe Air Travel Have
in Common, 2002 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 13 (2002) (discussing evolution of software
patents based on Diamond v. Diehr decision); see also DoPRt, supra note 20, at
§ 8.10 (indicating United States patents in software technology increased from
1,774 in 1987 to 2,830 in 1992 because of shift in thinking by Supreme Court
concerning patenting software technology); Joseph Robert Brown, Jr., Note,
Software Patent Dynamics: Software as Patentable Subject Matter after State Street Bank &
Trust Co., 25 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 639, 645 (2000) ("Between 1978 and 1987, the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued only 262 software patents; however,
the PTO issued over 4500 software patents in 1994 alone.").
41. See DoRR, supra note 20, at § 8.10 (showing increase in software patents
led to successful litigation efforts for patent holders).
42. See MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAw, 326 (Richard A.
Epstein et al. eds., 2000) (stating software patents must still pass tests under 35
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112).
43. See MERGES, supra note 37, at 1059 (indicating one company sued several
other companies for patent infringement and warned thousands of others of po-
tential infringement litigation); see also LEMLEY, supra note 42, at 321 (stating de-
bate over allowing .software patents originates from public policy argument and
philosophical standpoint).
2004]
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by law."'44 The grant of a patent by the USPTO confers to the pat-
ent holder the right to exclude others from the use and practice of
the invention for a specified number of years. 45 Patent infringe-
ment is an outgrowth of tort law, where a violation occurs even
though it is innocently performed or performed without knowledge
of the violation.46 A patentee may bring a civil action to remedy
44. Creation of the U.S. Patent System, at http://www.ideafinder.com/history/
inventions/story096.htm (last modified Apr. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Creation] (re-
viewing history of United States Patent System). The United States first issued a
patent in 1790 to Samuel Hopkins for an improved process for making potash. See
FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS:
THE TOTAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE RIGHTS TO YOUR INVENTION, PRODUCT, OR
TRADEMARK... Now BETTER THAN EVER 227 (2d ed. 1993) (summarizing history of
patent system). Initially, all United States patents were reviewed by the Secretary
of State (Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, and then
approved by the President of the United States (George Washington). See Creation,
supra. Upon recognizing the review of patents was too much work for high rank-
ing officers, the administration delegated the examining of patents to state depart-
ment clerks before it was reassigned to the U.S. Patent Office in 1802. See id.
(reviewing history of United States patent system). Because preserving the histori-
cal advances found in patents is so important to the United States government and
the American society, a special vault was constructed in Pennsylvania's limestone
mines to store a second copy of every patent ever issued in the United States. See
PETERJENNINGS & TODD BREWSTER, IN SEARCH OF AMERICA 129-30 (Elisabeth King
& Peter Meyer, eds. 2002) (indicating vault was created in reaction to 1836 fire
that destroyed contents of original patent office). The limestone caves of the
records center are kept at a constant sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit, providing the
necessary atmospheric conditions and security. See id. at 129 (describing atmos-
pheric conditions of vault). The vault is located in western Pennsylvania, 200 feet
below the surface of the terrain. See id. (discussing depth of tomb). Because of the
location and characteristics of the records center, the facility can survive a nuclear
attack, and therefore, "the raw mateial[s] to reconstruct American society" are
safe from destruction. See id. (indicating purpose of vault).
45. See 6 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 22:1, at 408 (3d ed. 1987) (describing rights of patent holder); see also 5 DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALID-
ITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.01, at 16-5 (2002) [hereinafter 5 CHISUM] ("A patent
confers the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering for sale
the invention within the United States or importing the invention into the United
States."); RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 9:2 (3d ed.
2001) (stating on June 8, 1995, patent protection changed from seventeen years
from issue date to twenty years from filing date of parent or initial application).
Protection for patent owners derives from the United States Constitution under
Article I, section 8, clause 8, which states: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). "The primary purpose of our
patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts and
sciences." Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31
(1945); see also Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science
Struggling with the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (1992) (discussing objec-
tive of United States patent system).
46. See EARL W. KINTNER & JACK LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL -PROPERTY LAW PRI-
MER: A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PATENTS, TRADE SECRETS, TRADEMARKS, FRANCHISES,
[Vol. 11: p. 173
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infringement of a protected patent.47 Patent infringement occurs
when one interferes with the exclusive rights of the patent owner.48
When infringement occurs, one may be liable for direct infringe-
ment, inducement, or contributory infringement.49 For an individ-
ual, infringement is determined by the application of the
invention. 50 In contrast, a manufacturer's liability for infringement
is determined by examining how the device may reasonably be used
or is reasonably capable of being used.51
1. Direct Infringement
Direct infringement occurs when an individual makes, uses, of-
fers to sell, or sells an invention defined by the claims of a patent
without the permission of the patent holder.52 The claims of the
COPYRIGHTS, AND PERSONALITY AND ENTERTAINMENT RIGHTS 83 (2d ed. 1982) (dis-
cussing legal origin of patent infringement).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (indicating remedy for patent infringement).
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000) (" [W]hoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent there-
for, infringes the patent."). Patent infringement is "[t]he unauthorized making,
using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into the United States any patented
invention." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 785 (7th ed. 1999) (defining patent
infringement).
49. See HILDRETH, supra note 45, at § 9:2 (listing various infringement catego-
ries). For a general discussion on direct infringement, see infra notes 52-70 and
accompanying text. Direct infringement is additionally broken up into literal in-
fringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. For a discussion
on literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents, see infra notes 64-70 and
accompanying text. For a discussion on inducement, see infra notes 113-22 and
accompanying text. For a discussion on contributory infringement, see infra notes
123-33 and accompanying text.
50. See Huck Mfg. v. Textron, Inc., No. 35956, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12539, at
*76 n.24 (E.D. Mich. May 2, 1975) (illustrating different theories for manufacturer
and user). Huck was the assignee and manufacturer of a patent for blind rivets.
See id. at *1-2 (reviewing history of patent). Blind rivets are "mechanical device [s]
which can be used to connect an assembly of two or more parts together where
access for fastener installation can be had to only one side of the assembly." Id. at
*7-8. Textron allegedly infringed Huck's patent by manufacturing blind rivets. See
id. at *2 (commenting on Textron's products). The court determined that the
blind rivets sold by Textron infringed Huck's patent, and even though Textron's
blind rivets were capable of non-infringing use, Textron could not escape liability
by warning customers not to use blind rivets in an infringing manner. See id. at *77
n.26 (holding warning for customers not to infringe does not prevent liability for
infringement).
51. See id. at *76 n.24 (defining different liability for user than for
manufacturer).
52. See § 271 (a) (defining direct infringement); see also 5 CHISUM, supra note
45, § 16.01, at 16-5 (outlining patent infringement); ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS
AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 298 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining patent infringement).
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patent are what the "applicant believes is patentable. ' 53 In a U.S.
patent, the claims of the invention define the boundaries of the
patent's protection. 54 Thus, infringement occurs on the claims of
the patent. 55
Direct infringement is an unintentional tort.56 For infringe-
ment to occur, there must first be a valid patent.57 The determina-
tion of whether the accused device falls within the claims of a
patent is a question of fact.58 The courts use a two-step analysis to
determine whether infringement has occurred.59 The Federal Cir-
53. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 45, § 16.01, at 16-5 (asserting Patent Act of 1836
introduced term "claims" to identify what patent protects). Specifically, patent
claims:
measure the invention for determining patentability both during exami-
nation and after issuance when validity is challenged. They also deter-
mine what constitutes infringement. A claim recites a number of
elements or limitations, and will cover or "read on" only those products
(or processes) that contain all such elements or limitations. Effective
claims must be neither too broad (i.e., cover the prior art or matter not
adequately described in the specification) nor too narrow (i.e., fail to
cover all possible embodiments of the applicant's invention). The appli-
cant may for safety's sake include a reasonable number of claims of vary-
ing scope.
1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABIL-
iTY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT G1-3 (2003) [hereinafter 1 CHISUM].
54. See U.S. Patent No. 4,918,603 (issued Apr. 17, 1990) (showing example of
patent claims section).
55. See LIPsCOMB, supra note 45, § 22:2, at 410 (noting patent claims are pro-
tected, not "four corners" of patent); see also CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 527
F.2d 95, 100 (7th Cir. 1975) ("The question of infringement . . . is answered by
comparing the accused device with the claims of the patent.").
56. See HARMON, supra note 52, at 297 (stating infringement does not require
intent).
57. See LIPSCOMB, supra note 45, § 22:3, at 418 (asserting patent must be valid
before court can find infringement); see also Gleick, supra note 36, at 46 (criticizing
United States Patent and Trademark Office's authorization of software patents).
58. See Davies v. U.S., 31 Fed. Cl. 769, 778 (1994) (citing S.R.I. Int'l v. Matsu-
shita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). In Davies, the plaintiff
owned a patent on a remote monitoring and weapon control system that allowed a
user to simultaneously track a target and trigger a weapon system. See id. at 770-71
(reviewing capability of Davis's patent). The defendant, the United States govern-
ment, used a similar device, called PAVE TACK, on their F-4E, RF-4C and F-111F
aircraft that allowed a weapons officer on board the aircraft to illuminate a target
using a laser and view the target for destruction. See id. at 772 (stating capability of
PAVE TACK). The court found PAVE TACK did not infringe Davis's patent be-
cause the military device could not simultaneously track the target and trigger the
weapon. See id. at 778 (distinguishing PAVE TACK from Davis's product). Only
through human manipulation of the PAVE TACK device was the system capable of
infringing the claims of Davis's patent. See id. at 778-79 (illustrating human inter-
vention required to perform same function as Davis's device).
59. See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(illustrating court using two-step analysis); see also Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v.
SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("A determination of
infringement requires a two-step analysis."); Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp.,
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cuit stated, "[t]he first step is determining the meaning and scope
of the patent claims [alleged] to be infringed. The second step is
comparing the properly construed claims to the device accused of
infringing."60 The first step is a question of law determined by the
court; the second step is ascertained by the fact-finder.61 A court
may refer to the "specification, the prosecution history, and the
other claims in the patent" to resolve claim interpretation. 62
The burden is on the patentee to bring forth evidence showing
direct infringement.63 The patentee may prove infringement ei-
ther by showing literal infringement or infringement under the
265 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[P]atent infringement analysis requires two
steps."); Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp.,
55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (showing court used two-step analysis); Mannes-
mann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating patent infringement requires two-step process). Stryker
obtained a patent for Stryke-Flow, a battery-powered suction irrigator used in surgi-
cal procedures. See Stryker, 234 F.3d at 1255 (reviewing history of patent). Prior to
issuance of Stryker's patent, Davol developed a similar battery-powered suction irri-
gator called the Hydro-Surg after examining the Stryke-Flow device. See id. (com-
menting on Davol's product). After the court issued a permanent injunction
against Davol for its continued use of the Hydro-Surg, Davol began selling a modi-
fied version of the Hydro-Surg. See id. at 1256 (reviewing history between Davol
and Stryke-Flow). The Federal Circuit found the modified Hydro-Surg did in-
fringe Stryker's patent because, after determination by the district court that the
modified Hydro-Surg infringed the Stryke-Flow patent, Davol failed to prove that
the district court committed error by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 1259
(commenting on why court found infringement).
60. Stryker, 234 F.3d at 1258 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Markman represents an important case
because it established that in a trial by jury, the court has the obligation to deter-
mine the meaning of the patent claims. See 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT
§ 18.06(2) (a) (iv), at 18-1073 to 18-1082 (2002) [hereinafter 5A CHISUM] (explain-
ing Markman decision).
61. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853) and Markman v. West-
view Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Teleflex, an infringement suit
erupted when Ficosa and Teleflex, both manufacturers of shift cables for automo-
biles, began to compete in the same market. See id. at 1320 (reviewing facts of
case). Prior to the suit, Ficosa and Teleflex operated independently in different
markets around the world. See id. (commenting on facts of case). When Ficosa
tried to enter Teleflex's market of General Motors Sports Utility Vehicles sold in
the United States, Teleflex brought suit against Ficosa for patent infringement. See
id. (explaining why Teleflex brought suit against Ficosa). The Federal Circuit held
for Teleflex, finding literal infringement by Ficosa's shift cable. See id. at 1329
(stating Ficosa's shift cable literally infringed Teleflex's patent).
62. Mannesmann, 793 F.2d at 1282.
63. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123-24 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1984) and SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir.
1983)); see also 5A CHISUM, supra note 60, § 1804(1) (a) (iii), at 18-263 (stating bur-
den on plaintiff to bring forth evidence of infringement).
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doctrine of equivalents. 64 Literal infringement occurs when prop-
erly construed claims "read on" the accused device. 65 There is no
infringement, despite a finding of literal infringement, if the prod-
uct performs the function in a substantially different way.66 In-
fringement occurs under the doctrine of equivalents when there is
no literal infringement, but the claims are met equivalently. 67
Under the doctrine of equivalents, a one-to-one correlation be-
tween the accused device and the valid patent is not required. 68
Rather, "the differences between the claimed device and the ac-
cused device must be insubstantial."69 Liability is found if a single
claim is infringed.70
64. See HARMON, supra note 52, at 301 (commenting Federal Circuit has
adopted "All Limitations Rule" for patent infringement). In the "All Limitations
Rule," every limitation set forth in the claim must be found in the accused device
or process either exactly or in equivalents. See Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo
Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
65. See Coming, 868 F.2d at 1258 (finding literal infringement occurs when
accused device embodies claims); see also Conner Peripherals, Inc. v. W. Digital
Corp., No. C-93-20117-RMW-EAI, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *20-21 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 1993) ("In the determination of infringement, the words of a claim
must first be construed, and, as properly interpreted, then 'read on' the accused
structure to determine whether each of the limitations recited in the claim is pre-
sent in the accused structure."); Louis S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected
Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United States, 11 PAc. RIM L. & PoL'YJ. 319,
329-30 (2002) (reviewing United States court procedure for patent claims).
66. See SRI, 775 F.2d at 1125 ("Equivalence and non-equivalence, as the terms
indicate, are but opposite sides of the same coin. In determining each, a court
must say whether an accused device operates in substantially the same way (equiva-
lence) or in a substantially different way (non-equivalence)."). The issue in SRI
was whether defendant's camera and filter infringed upon SRI's protected claims.
See id. at 1118 (reviewing facts of case).
67. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934-35 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (discussing doctrine of equivalents). Chisum states:
[The] doctrine prevents a person from practicing a fraud on a patent by
substituting obvious equivalents for elements in the claims in order to
avoid their literal language. An accused product or process will infringe a
claim, though outside its literal terms, if it does the same work in substan-
tially the same way to accomplish substantially the same result as the pat-
ented product or process. Pioneer inventions are entitled to a greater
range of equivalents than a lesser improvement. The doctrine can work
in reverse, excluding an accused device that falls within the literal lan-
guage of a claim but operates in an essentially different manner.
1 CHisUM, supra note 53, at GI-6.1.
68. See Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832
(Fed. Cir. 1991). For a further discussion of the facts in Inte4 see infra notes 75-82
and accompanying text.
69. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)).
70. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1329, 1330 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 1987). Panduit sued Dennison for infringement of twenty-eight patent
claims. See id. at 1330 (reviewing facts of case). Dennison countered it was at most
liable for four of the claims. See id. at 1330 (commenting Dennison did not dis-
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2. Literal Infringement
To prove literal infringement, "each limitation of the claim
must be met by the accused device exactly, any deviation from the
claim preclud[es] a finding of infringement."71 The Federal Cir-
cuit recently stated, "in determining whether a product claim is in-
fringed, . . . an accused device may be found to infringe if it is
reasonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations, even though
it may also be capable of non-infringing modes of operation."72 A
product that "sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed
method nonetheless infringes. ' 73 Infringement, however, does not
occur "simply because it is possible to alter [a device] in a way that
would satisfy all the limitations of a patent claim. '74
a. Intel Becomes the Goal Line: A Look at One End of the
Spectrum
In Intel Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission ("In-
tel"),75 the Federal Circuit held intent to infringe is not a prerequi-
site in proving direct infringement.76 The capability of a device to
infringe is sufficient to find direct infringement. 77 Intel provides
the analytical framework for cases involving patents that allegedly
have the capability to infringe.7 8
pute it infringed four patent claims). After Panduit received a judgment for pat-
ent infringement, Dennison appealed. See id. (revealing procedural history of
case). The Federal Circuit dismissed the frivolous appeal and awarded Panduit
attorneys' fees. See id. at 1331-32 (commenting court awarded costs and attorney's
fees because suit was frivolous).
71. HARMON, supra note 52, at 308 (citing Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32
F.3d 542 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
72. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citing Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
73. Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp.,
55 F.3d 615, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (revealing device infringes even though infring-
ing use not always present).
74. High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., 49 F.3d 1551,
1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Okor v. Sega of Am., Inc., 30 Fed. Appx. 950, 952
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing to original case).
75. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
76. See id. at 832 (holding accused device need only be capable of operating
in page mode to find infringement).
77. See id. ("[Alctual [infringing] operation in the accused device is not
required.").
78. See, e.g., Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Cyrix
Corp. v. SGS-Thompson Microelectronics, Inc., 77 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1996); High
Tech, 49 F.3d at 1551; Conner Peripherals v. W. Digital Corp., No. C-93-20117-
RMW-EAI, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148 at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1993).
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Specifically, Intel Corporation alleged Atmel Corporation,
General Instrument Corporation, and Microchip Technology In-
corporated violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing
Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories ("EPROM's") and as-
sociated components. 79 Intel stated the EPROM's infringed six of
their U.S. product patents and two of their U.S. process patents.80
The defendants challenged Intel's patents and the allegations of
infringement.81 The Federal Circuit held that for "the accused de-
vice to be infringing, [it] need only be capable of operating in the
[infringing manner]. Contrary to [the defendant's] argument, ac-
tual [infringing] operation in the accused device is not required."8 2
Recently, in Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc.
("Fantasy"),13 the Federal Circuit reviewed the Intel decision. In
1990, Michael and Patrick Hughes received a patent for a comput-
erized statistical football game.8 4 U.S. Patent Number 4,918,603
comprised an apparatus and method for playing fantasy football on
a computer.8 5 The '603 patent contained a claim limitation for
awarding "bonus points. '8 6 SportsLine.com, Yahoo!, and ESPN/
79. See Inte4 946 F.2d at 824 (indicating importation of infringing products
violates § 337). Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(1988). See id. (reviewing subsequent history of Act). The codified statute prohib-
its the "[i]mportation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of
articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent or a valid and
enforceable United States copyright registered under Title 17 . . . ." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1) (B)(i) (2000). EPROM's are "monolithic integrated circuit[s] con-
tamining thousands of metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) transistor cells on which
encoded binary information can be stored." Intel, 946 F.2d at 824 n.2 (defining
EPROM's).
80. See id. at 824 n.3 (listing patents at issue: U.S. Patent Nos. 3,938,108;
4,048,518; 4,103,189; 4,114,255; 4,223,394; 4,519,050; and 4,685,084). One of In-
tel's patents was withdrawn from consideration. See id. at 824 (noting change in
suit against defendants).
81. See id. (reviewing procedural history of case). The defendants, Atmel and
General Instrument Corporation, import EPROM's in the following sizes: 64K,
256K, 512K, 513K and 1024Kt See id. at 824 n.4 (listing products imported by de-
fendants). Only the imported EPROM's of 64K and 1024K were at issue in this
case. See id. (naming devices accused of infringement).
82. Id. at 832 (clarifying requirement for literal infringement).
83. 287 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
84. See U.S. Patent No. 4,918,603 (issued Apr. 17, 1990) (revealing claims of
patent). Fantasy Sports is the assignee of the '603 patent. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at
1111 (indicating ownership of patent).
85. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1111 (reviewing claims of patent); see also U.S.
Patent No. 4,918,603 (issued Apr. 17, 1990) (listing claims of patent).
86. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1113-14 (describing "bonus points" limitation in-
terpretation). The Federal Circuit concluded the "bonus point" element was "lim-
ited to additional points awarded beyond those given in an actual football game
for unusual scoring plays, such as when a player scores in a manner not typically
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Starwave Partners ("ESPN") all developed and offered products
similar to those described in the '603 patent.8 7 Additionally, Sports-
Line.corn sold a software package, called Commissioner.com, which
enabled users to modify and manage their own fantasy leagues.88
Fantasy sued SportsLine.com, Yahoo!, and ESPN alleging their fan-
tasy games infringed Fantasy's patent.8 9 In Fantasy Sports Properties,
Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc. ("Fantasy '),90 the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Yahoo!.91 Accordingly, in Fantasy
Sports Properties v. SportsLine.com ("Fantasy i",),92 the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of SportsLine.com and ESPN
based on the court's decision in Fantasy L 93
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that there was a factual
dispute precluding the court from determining whether Commis-
associated with his position." Id. at 1114; see also U.S. Patent No. 4,918,603 (issued
Apr. 17, 1990) (indicating bonus points are additional source of points).
87. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1116-17 (describing Yahoo!'s, ESPN's, and Sports-
Line's products). The Yahoo! product awards "miscellaneous points" when players
other than the offense score points. See id. at 1116 (noting product by Yahoo!
awarded points other than those given out during normal course of football
game). The ESPN product grants points to offensive players based on how they
score in the game (i.e., a quarterback would receive four points for completing a
passing touchdown and six points for rushing or receiving a touchdown). See id.
(showing ESPN product did not follow standard scoring of football game). Finally,
the SportsLine.com product does not award "bonus points" unless the user enables
the program. See id. at 1117 (showing product enabled users to choose whether
bonus points were awarded).
88. See id. (suggesting Commissioner.com software package includes similar
scoring system to one found in '603 patent).
89. See id. at 1112 (revealing Fantasy filed suit against defendants based on
alleged infringement by Yahoo! Sports Fantasy Football, ESPN Fantasy Football,
and three SportsLine games including: Fantasy Football, Football Challenge, and
Commissioner.com). Fantasy argued the "bonus point" element of its patent was
infringed upon by defendants' fantasy games. See id. (suggesting SportsLine.com,
Yahoo!, and ESPN infringed '603 patent).
90. 103 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Va. 2000).
91. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1111 (revealing Yahoo! filed motion for summary
judgment, arguing game did not infringe because game did not satisfy "bonus
point" limitation).
92. Fantasy I, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
93. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1112 (discussing how subsequent to decision in
Fantasy I, SportsLine.com and ESPN filed motions for summary judgment based
on district court's decision regarding Yahoo! game). The district court concluded
both SportsLine.com's and ESPN's games did not infringe the '603 patent. See id.
(holding SportsLine.com and ESPN's products did not infringe because they did
not award bonus points for "out-of-position" scoring). The district court also de-
termined SportsLine.com's Commissioner.com product did not directly infringe
because it was not a game, but a "'software tool by which [subscribers] operate
their own fantasy football leagues on customized internet web pages."' Id. (quot-
ing Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc., No. 2:99 Civ. 2131 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 25, 2001)).
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sioner.com infringed Fantasy's patent.94 As a result, the court va-
cated the district court's grant of summary judgment and
remanded to allow the district court to determine, under a direct
infringement analysis, whether the software was capable of infringe-
ment.95 The Fantasy court reaffirmed its holding in Inte196 and
found that if a computer program has the means present in the
software to infringe, then the device infringes.
97
b. The Opposite End Zone: High Tech and the Other Side of
the Spectrum
In High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Industries,
Inc. ("High Tech"), 98 the Federal Circuit ruled a handheld endo-
scope did not infringe a valid patent even when it had the capability
to infringe.9 9 In 1989, Miles Milbank and Perry Williams were is-
sued a patent for a modular endoscopic apparatus with image rota-
tion.100 New Image also manufactured a similar intraoral
endoscope. 10 1 The Milbank and Williams patented device differed
from the New Image device ("AcuCam") because the Milbank and
Williams endoscopic camera rotated within its housing.10 2 The dis-
94. See id. at 1119 (remanding case back to district court for evidentiary in-
quiry). The Federal Circuit was unclear whether the Commissioner.com product,
manufactured by SportsLine.com, awarded bonus points to kickers when they
scored out of position. See id. (questioning capability to award additional points
for out-of-position scoring).
95. See id. (remanding case back to district court). The court also affirmed
the district court's holdings that Yahoo!'s, ESPN's, and SportsLine's fantasy foot-
ball games did not infringe Fantasy's '603 patent. See id. at 1120 (discussing hold-
ing of Federal Circuit).
96. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
97. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1119 (illustrating court followed decision of Intel).
98. 49 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
99. See id. at 1556 (holding handheld endoscope did not infringe even after
manipulation).
100. See U.S. Patent No. 4,858,001 (issued Aug. 15, 1989) (describing pro-
tected patent). High Tech, a San Francisco company, is the assignee of the hand-
held endoscope. See id. (describing history and ownership of patent). An endo-
scope is "[a] lighted viewing instrument that is inserted into a body cavity for the
purpose of investigating and treating disorders." THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 405 (Charles B. Clayman, MD ed., 1989).
101. See High Tech, 49 F.3d at 1553 (explaining in early 1991, New Image
bought company manufacturing intraoral endoscopes and began selling device
under "AcuCam").
102. See id. (indicating AcuCam camera does not rotate because two set screws
prohibit movement of camera within housing). The court determined the Acu-
Cam utilized software to rotate images on a viewing screen. See id. (illustrating
difference between AcuCam and patented device). Compare with U.S. Patent No.
4,858,001 (issued Aug. 15, 1989) (describing patented device as "rotatable relative
to the target area").
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trict court granted High Tech preliminary injunctive relief because
High Tech proved AcuCam infringed the U.S. 4,858,001 patent and
High Tech would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a pre-
liminary injunction. 103 On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined
the district court committed legal error and reversed the prelimi-
nary injunction.1 04 Specifically, the Federal Circuit determined the
district court's interpretation of Intel did not lead to a conclusion
that a device infringes if, after manipulation, it has the capability to
infringe. 10 5 The Federal Circuit, in distinguishing the Intel case,
stated:
Intel does not support so broad a holding. All that was
required by the limitation at issue in Intel was that the
claimed invention, an integrated circuit memory device,
was "programmable" to operate in a certain manner. The
accused device, although not specifically designed or sold
to operate in that manner, could be programmed to do
so; that is, it was "programmable" to operate in the desig-
nated mode. The claim at issue in Intel therefore read on
the accused device, as made and sold. 10 6
Similarly, in Chem-Tainer Industries, Inc. v. Wilkin ("Chem-
Tained'),107 a California district court determined the manipulation
of a bait tank by a user to configure it to perform like the patented
tank did not constitute infringement.10 8 The district court further
suggested, that in determining whether a device infringes, "It] he
question is not what [a device] might have been made to do, but
what it was intended to do and did do."10 9
103. See High Tech, 49 F.3d at 1553-54 (reviewing district court's analysis under
four-part test for granting preliminary injunctions).
104. See id. at 1558 (finding district court committed legal errors in determin-
ing High Tech's likelihood of success on infringement claim and that High Tech
would suffer irreparable harm).
105. See id. at 1555-56 (arguing Intel does not support district court's broad
holding).
106. Id. (italics added) (differentiating High Tech from Intel). The court con-
cluded the manipulation of the AcuCam was not sufficient to finding direct in-
fringement. See id. at 1556 (indicating manipulation of device to infringe not
sufficient to warrant infringement).
107. No. 97-0829, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17241 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1997).
108. See id. at *16 n.9 (holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate likelihood of
literal infringement). A bait tank is used to keep bait alive for fishing. See id. at *3
(defining use of bait tank). Bait tanks have a fluid inlet at the bottom of the tank
and fluid outlet at the top of the tank. See id. at *16 n.9 (describing structure of
bait tank).
109. Id. (citing Hap Corp. v. Heyman Mfr., 311 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963)). Hap Corp. was decided before the Federal Circuit
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The Federal Circuit possibly narrowed the manipulation ex-
ception in Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Linvatec Corp. ("Bionx").11° In
Bionx, the Federal Circuit held the manipulation of a device on a
videotape to prove infringement was valid when the patent contem-
plated use with other devices."' Thus, if a patented device contem-
plates use with other devices, the manipulation exception may not
be useful in defending against infringement.' 1 2
3. Inducement
One may be liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) for inducement if
purposeful intent is proven, even if the device has a non-infringing
use." 3 Section 271(b) states, "whoever actively induces infringe-
ment of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."'" 4 Robert L. Har-
mon, a distinguished legal scholar, stated, "[a] person infringes by
actively and knowingly aiding and abetting another's direct in-
fringement."' '15 For a court to find inducement, there must be ac-
tual intent to induce infringement and direct infringement.
1 6
was established, so the denial of certiorari is relevant because the Federal Circuit is
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See id. (noting United
State Supreme Court denied certiorari).
110. 299 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
111. See id. at 1382-83 (noting use of cannula to aid BioStinger in penetrating
uncut tissue was valid because written description of patent described two ways for
inserting claimed suture).
112. See id. (indicating possible exception to Federal Circuit's holding in High
Tech).
113. See LiPsCOMB, supra note 45, § 22:6, at 427 (citing Westinghouse Elec. &
Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1926) noting inducement is
based on intent).
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000) (defining inducement).
115. HARMON, supra note 52, at 382 (defining active inducement). It is cru-
cial that the inducer has actual or constructive knowledge of the patent. See id.
(stating inducement by mistake not infringement); see also Manville Sales Corp. v.
Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The plaintiff has the
burden of showing that the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing acts and
that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual
infringements.").
116. See Snuba Int'l, Inc. v. Dolphin World, Inc., No. 99-1357, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16946, at *17 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2000) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v.
Komers Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Met-Coil was the
assignee of a patent for a device that connected metal ductwork used for heating
and air conditioning. See id. at 685 (reviewing history of patent). Met-Coil owned
and sold the patented machines that manipulated the metal ductwork for easy
connecting. See id. (describing how device configured ductwork). Met-Coil also
sold specially created corner pieces that connected with the manipulated
ductwork. See id. (indicating Met-Coil also sold separate products for use with pat-
ented device). Korners Unlimited also sold specially created corner pieces that
could connect with the Met-Coil ductwork. See id. (stating Korners was in competi-
tion with Met-Coil). The Federal Circuit found no infringement, inducement, or
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Only circumstantial evidence is required to prove intent to induce
infringement."17 Designing an infringing device for another may
constitute inducement.""8 Equally, advertising or instructing a
buyer to use a device in an infringing manner may be considered
inducement.119
In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M) v. Chemque,
Inc. ("3M'), 1 20 the Federal Circuit ruled Chemque had induced its
customers to infringe 3M's patents. 121 The court noted Chemque
supplied infringing products to customers with instructions on how
to use the products in an infringing manner, thus establishing
inducement.122
4. Contributory Infringement
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c), an individual is guilty of contribu-
tory infringement if:
[The person] sells . . . a component of a patented ma-
chine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented pro-
cess, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
contributory infringement because there was an implied license to sell the corner
sections, and thus no direct infringement. See id. at 687 (holding because of im-
plied license, device did not infringe patent). Accordingly, because the court
found there was no direct infringement, they also found there was no inducement
of the product or contributory infringement. See id. at 687 (reviewing that without
showing of direct infringement, no inducement or contributory infringement ex-
ists). For a discussion on why contributory infringement was not found based on a
finding of no direct infringement, see infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
117. See HARMON, supra note 52, at 378 (indicating circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to prove intent to induce).
118. See Baut v. Pethick Constr. Co., 262 F. Supp. 350, 360-61 (M.D. Pa. 1966)
(holding creators of infringing stained glass window liable for inducement because
all participated in design decisions); see also 5 CHISUM, supra note 45, § 17.04[4], at
17-80 (defining scenarios of inducement).
119. See5 CHISUM, supra note 45, § 17.04[4], at 17-82 n.19 (citing, as example,
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975)).
120. 303 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
121. See id. at 1305 (referencing recent Federal Circuit inducement decision).
3M held rights to an encapsulants patent. See id. at 1298 (describing patent held
by 3M). Encapsulants are used to protect signal transmission devices, such as elec-
trical or optical cables. See id. (indicating uses of encapsulants). First, the Federal
Circuit determined Chemque was aware of the patents held by 3M. See id. at 1305
(stating Chemque fulfilled first element of inducement). Second, the court found
Chemque supplied the infringing products to its customers with instructions on
how they were to be used, including an infringing use. See id. (declaring Chemque
possessed intent to infringe 3M's patent). Therefore, the Federal Circuit deter-
mined Chemque had induced the infringement of 3M's patent. See id. at 1309
(holding Chemque infringed 3M's patent).
122. See id. (holding Chemque induced infringement of 3M's patent).
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the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
non-infringing use. 12 3
Under § 271 (c), infringement will likely occur when an indi-
vidual sells "a component that was itself not technically covered by
the claims of a product or process patent but that had no other use
except with the claimed product or process."1 24 In order for con-
tributory infringement to occur, direct infringement must be pre-
sent.1 25 Thus, contributory infringement "imposes liability on one
who aids or abets another in an act of direct infringement."1 26 In-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, § 271 (c) requires that a person
guilty of contributory infringement have knowledge that the device
was made or adapted for use in an infringing manner. 127 The Fed-
eral Circuit stated, "there can be no contributory infringement
without knowledge that the component made or sold was especially
adapted for a particular use prescribed by a known patent." 128
Courts decline to find contributory infringement in cases where a
device is capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses.129
In Pollock v. Thunderline-Z, Inc. ("Pollock"),130 the Federal Circuit
ruled Thunderline-Z infringed Pollock's patent because: (1) its
123. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
124. HARMON, supra note 52, at 378 (describing when contributory infringe-
ment is likely to occur); see also, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., Inc., 377 U.S. 476, 488 n.7 (1964) (declaring fabric replacements for
Ford convertibles not capable of other non-infringing use and were designed spe-
cifically for Ford convertible cars because they did not fit any other models).
125. See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating direct infringement must be proven to find contributory
infringement); see also Snuba Int'l, Inc. v. Dolphin World, Inc., No. 99-1357, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 16946, at *19 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2000) ("As with induced infringe-
ment, there can be no contributory infringement without direct infringement.").
But see The Upjohn Co. v. Syntro Corp., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1469, 1473 (D. Del. 1990)
(suggesting direct infringer need not be party in contributory infringement suit).
126. LIPSCOMB, supra note 45, § 22:7, at 429 (footnote omitted) (providing
additional definition for contributory infringement).
127. See Aro, 377 U.S. at 488 (indicating knowledge required for contributory
infringement); see also HARMON, supra note 52, at 378 (explaining intent is not
required).
128. Snuba, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16946, at *19 (citing Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
129. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 45, § 17.03[3], at 17-60 to 17-61 (commenting
prior decisions codified in § 271 (c)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (2000) (codifying
prior court decisions). But see LIPSCOMB, supra note 45, at 434 (explaining if seller
knew or intended device to be capable of both infringing and non-infringing use,
and such was used in infringing manner, then seller may not argue non-infringing
use as defense).
130. No. 98-1191, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20883 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 1999).
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product directly infringed Pollock's patent, (2) it had knowledge of
customers using its device to infringe the protected patent, and (3)
its product was not a staple article capable of other non-infringing
uses.13 In Pollock, the defendants attempted to claim ignorance of
the infringing use because the defendants stamped on their feed-
through product a disclaimer that the product could infringe if
used in an improper way.132 The court rejected the defense and
stated intent is not necessary in finding contributory infringe-
ment.1 3
3
5. The Hypothetical "Hard Case"
Suppose "Manufacturer A" creates and receives a patent on
"Software Program A." Software Program A is a computer game
where "bonus points" are awarded based on the difficulty of play. 34
Now assume "Manufacturer B" creates "Software Program B." The
software is placed on the open market. "User C" purchases the
product and uses Software Program B in a non-infringing manner.
131. See id. at *9-12 (commenting on why court found contributory
infringement).
132. See id. at *10 (stating defendant's claim). A feedthrough, described in
United States Patent 4,841,101, is a device that allows a high expansion metal, like
aluminum, to gain uniform radial thickness in its solderjoint. See U.S. Patent No.
4,841,101 (issued June 20, 1989) (defining feedthrough). The feedthrough helps
maintain the spacing and thickness of the solder joint. See id. (defining use of
feedthrough). Without a feedthrough, high expansion metals often fatigue and
fail, especially in military operations, because the solder creeps under high stress
and fails. See id. (indicating potential problems with high expansion metals with-
out use of feedthrough). Feedthroughs are not necessary in low expansion materi-
als such as steel because there is less expansion of the steel under stress. See id.
(commenting on properties of low expansion metals).
133. See Pollock, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20883, at *10 (commenting "Thunder-
line-Z confuses intent to infringe with knowledge of infringement").
134. See Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108,
1111 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (illustrating Fantasy's game awarded bonus points for more
difficult scoring scenarios). For hypothetical Software Program A, we assume the
independent claims are identical to the claims of Fantasy's patent. See id. at 1111-
12 (defining claims of Fantasy). The defining claim is as follows:
A computer for playing football based upon actual football games, com-
prising means for setting up individual football franchises; means for
drafting actual football players into said franchises; means for selecting
starting player rosters from said actual football players; means for trading
said actual football players; means for scoring performances of said actual
football players based upon actual game scores such that franchises auto-
matically calculate a composite win or loss score from a total of said indi-
vidual actual football players' scores; said players' scores are for
quarterbacks, running backs and pass receivers in a first group and kick-
ers in a second group; and wherein said players in said first and second
groups receive bonus points.
Id. at 1111 (italics omitted) (listing claim at issue in Fantasy's patent); see also U.S.
Patent No. 4,918,603 (issued Apr. 17, 1990).
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Software Program B, however, has the ability to evolve through the
use of artificial intelligence based on the performance of User C.135
Consequently, due to random acts of User C, Software Program B
evolves into a game where bonus points are awarded in a manner
identical to that of Software Program A. Manufacturer B did not
intend or know Software Program B was capable of infringing
Software Program A. Does Manufacturer A, the creator and holder
of the patent for Software Program A, have a cause of action for
infringement against Manufacturer B because Software Program B
has the capability to infringe?
III. ANALYSIS OF THE "HARD CASE"
To determine whether Manufacturer A has a valid cause of ac-
tion against Manufacturer B for patent infringement, one must first
determine whether Manufacturer A's patent is valid and enforcea-
ble. 136 Here, the facts indicate Manufacturer A received a patent
for Software Program A. 13 7 Therefore, Manufacturer A possesses
an exclusive right to use and practice the invention for a specified
number of years.' 3 8 Manufacturer B, however, may still attempt to
prove the patent is invalid using one of many defenses, including:
expiration of the patent, lack of utility, anticipation by prior art,
abandonment, or obviousness over the prior art.139 Here, for pur-
poses of this Comment, it is assumed Manufacturer A's patent is
valid against all defenses posed by Manufacturer B.
The second determination is whether Software Program B in-
fringes the patent for Software Program A either directly, through
inducement, or through contributory infringement. 140
135. See, e.g., supra note 33 and accompanying text.
136. See LIPSCOMB, supra note 45, at 418 (noting court must first inquire into
validity of patent).
137. See supra pp. 70-72 for facts concerning hypothetical.
138. See5 CHIsUM, supra note 45, § 16.02, at 16-9 (describing rights conferred
to patent holder); see also HARMON, supra note 52, at 4 (citing Arachnid, Inc. v.
Merit Indus. Inc., 939 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991) to explain how rights of patent
holders expanded through patents).
139. See HILDRETH, supra note 45, at 231-32 (listing various defenses to patent
infringement).
140. See id. at 119-20 (commenting court must determine whether accused
device falls under any of the three infringement categories). Inducement and con-
tributory infringement require a showing of direct infringement. See Met-Coil Sys.
Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Absent di-
rect infringement of the patent claims, there can be neither contributory infringe-
ment, nor inducement of infringement.") (citations omitted).
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A. Did Software Program B Draw a Flag for
Direct Infringement?
To determine whether Manufacturer B infringes the patent of
Manufacturer A, one must apply § 271 (a) .141 First, according to the
facts presented, Manufacturer B developed and sold Software Pro-
gram B without the intent or knowledge of its infringing capabil-
ity. 14 2 Second, there is no evidence Manufacturer B contacted
Manufacturer A concerning its product.143 Thus, it is established
that Manufacturer B never gained authority to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell a device that infringed Manufacturer A's patent. 144
Under § 271 (a), an infringing device must be made, used, of-
fered for sale, or sold. 145 Manufacturer B created and sold Software
Program B to User C.14 6 Additionally, as already established, the
patent term for Software Program A has not expired.1 47 In estab-
lishing direct infringement under § 271(a), further analysis is re-
quired before a court can find patent infringement. 48
The key analysis under § 271(a) emerges from determining
whether the alleged device "reads on" the claims of the valid pro-
tected patent.1 49 A device infringes on the claims of a patent, not
the protected device itself.150 Courts, using the two-step patent in-
141. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (indicating elements for infringement).
142. See id. (showing language of statute does not require showing of intent or
knowledge under direct infringement); see also 5 CHISUM, supra note 45,
§ 16.02 [2], at 16-31 (stating direct infringement occurs regardless of knowledge or
intent).
143. See § 271 (a) (requiring individual to gain authority before making, us-
ing, or selling infringing device).
144. See id. (compelling individual to gain authority).
145. See id. (illustrating alleged infringer must make, use, offer for sale, or sell
infringing item).
146. See id. (indicating infringement occurs when infringing device is sold).
147. See id. (requiring valid patent). For a discussion on patent protection
term, see supra note 45.
148. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also Sorell, supra note 65, at 330.
It is important to note that the substantive body of American patent law
regarding claim interpretation and infringement analysis (both literal
and under the doctrine of equivalents) has evolved from case law: the
American patent statute is silent on this issue, and simply states that in-
fringement occurs if a person, without authority, "makes, uses, offers to
sell or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports
into the United States any patented invention" during the term of the
patent.
Sorell, supra note 65, at 330 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).
149. See generally Davies v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 769 (1994) (noting each
accused device must meet each limitation of claim in direct infringement suit).
150. See LIPSCOMB, supra note 45, at 410 (illustrating claims define protection
afforded by patent).
2004]
23
Schaal: Infringing a Fantasy: Future Obstacles Arise for the United State
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
196 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
fringement analysis, must first define the scope and meaning of the
patent claims and compare them to the alleged infringing de-
vice. 15 1 Here, Manufacturer A's patent claims define a method for
playing fantasy football on the computer that includes a "bonus
point" limitation. 152 Consequently, the scope and means of the pat-
ent include a device for playing fantasy football where place kickers
can receive "bonus points" for scoring in difficult scenarios (i.e.,
scoring a touchdown) .153
In determining whether Software Program B infringes Manu-
facturer A's patent claims, either literal infringement or infringe-
ment based on the doctrine of equivalents must be proven. 15 4
Under a literal infringement theory, Manufacturer A must
prove Software Program B "reads on" the claims of Manufacturer
A's patent.155 Here, Software Program B is performing identically
to Software Program A and embodies the claims of Manufacturer
A's patent.156 Consequently, because Software Program B "reads
on" Manufacturer A's patent claims, no further analysis is necessary
under the doctrine of equivalents. 157 As established previously, a
final determination of literal infringement must be reconciled with
the decisions in Fantasy1 5 8 and High Tech.159
151. :see Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir.
1998) as requiring two-step analysis); see also Chem-Tainer Indus. v. Wilkin, No. CV
97-0829, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17241, at *14-15 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (indicating two-
step analysis utilized).
152. See Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108,
1111 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (defining Fantasy's patent claim). For the purposes of this
Comment, the claims of the hypothetical Software Program A are the same as the
claim of U.S. Patent 4,918,603 held by Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. See id. (list-
ing claims); see also U.S. Patent No. 4,918,603 (issued Apr. 17, 1990) (citing
claims).
153. See U.S. Patent No. 4,918,603 (issued Apr. 17, 1990) (stating claims of
Fantasy's patent); see also Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1113-16 (discussing "bonus points"
limitation in Fantasy's product).
154. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing
Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1991) as holding
failure to meet single limitation either literally or through equivalence terminates
infringement claim). For a discussion on the doctrine of equivalents, see supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
155. See Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A. Inc., 868 F.2d 1251,
1258 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[The claims] must be 'read on' the accused structure to
determine whether each of the limitations recited in the claim is present in the
accused structure.").
156. See id. (finding literal infringement where device embodies claims).
157. See Sorell, supra note 65, at 330 (stating infringement based on equiva-
lence sought after determining device does not infringe literally).
158. Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1108.
159. High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus. Inc., 49 F.3d
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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B. Intel & Fantasy vs. High Tech
To establish literal infringement under Fantasy, Manufacturer
A must prove that Software Program B was programmed with the
capability to infringe. 160 Manufacturer A need not establish an in-
tent to infringe or even that the device has infringed. Rather, Man-
ufacturer A must establish the program had the capability to
infringe the protected patent.161 In the hypothetical scenario, User
C bought Software Program B and used the device in an infringing
manner. Manufacturer A's argument will be that the program, at
the time of sale, had the capability to infringe. 162 Manufacturer A
will argue that through the use of the program and artificial intelli-
gence, the program had the capability to infringe. 163
At odds with the Fantasy argument posed by the Manufacturer
A, Manufacturer B's argument will rely on High Tech.164 Manufac-
turer B will argue User C manipulated the device in causing the
infringement and, therefore, it should not be held liable.' 65 Fur-
ther, Manufacturer B will argue Software Program B was not
programmed with the capability of infringement, but rather, it was
the randomness of the artificial intelligence reacting to User C's
input that caused Software Program B to "read on" the claims of
the protected patent.166
160. See Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1118 (declaring software must have capability of
infringing process programmed into software before use).
161. See Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832
(holding accused device need only be capable of operating in page mode to find
infringement); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000) (lacking intent requirement).
162. See Huck Mfg. v. Textron, Inc., No. 35956, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12539,
at *76 (E.D. Mich. May 2, 1975) ("For a person who uses a[n infringing] device,
infringement is determined by the use to which the invention is actually put, but
for the manufacturer, infringement is determined by the use to which the device
may reasonably be put or of which it is reasonably capable.").
163. See Intel, 946 F.2d at 832 (holding accused device need only be capable of
infringing use to find infringement).
164. See High Tech, 49 F.3d at 1556 (holding manipulation of device to create
infringing capabilities not infringement). For a discussion of the facts of High
Tech, see supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
165. See High Tech, 49 F.3d at 1556 (holding manipulation of device to in-
fringe not infringement).
166. See id. (stating manipulation of device by user to make device infringe
does not trigger infringement liability for manufacturer). This scenario differs
from the Fantasy case because the software package did not have the capability to
infringe when it left the manufacturer's place of business. See Fantasy Sports
Props., Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating Com-
missioner.com product possibly had capability to infringe when sold to user). In
this case, the program only achieved the capability to infringe after use of the
program, manipulation by the artificial intelligence, and the random evolution of
the software program.
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The alleged infringer and the patentee's arguments turn on
whether the "product" software incorporated with artificial intelli-
gence is considered "means that are already present in the underly-
ing software" 167 or simply a manipulation of software by the user.168
C. Inducement?
Pending a decision by the court on whether direct infringe-
ment is found under the literal infringement analysis, Manufac-
turer A may also attempt to bring suit against Manufacturer B for
inducement. 169 Under § 271(b), one is liable for inducement if
there is intent to cause infringement. 170 Here, Manufacturer B
lacked the intent or even the knowledge that Software Program B
was capable of an infringing use. 171 There is no evidence that Man-
ufacturer B advertised the program's capability of infringement or
that Manufacturer B instructed User C to use the product in an
infringing manner.172 Therefore, courts may not find inducement
because software packages with advanced artificial intelligence, like
Software Program B, evolve and are based on each individual user's
inputs.173 The lack of foresight to what each and every software
package will become precludes a finding of inducement. 174
D. Contributory Infringement?
Again, pending a decision by the court finding direct infringe-
ment, Manufacturer A may also bring suit against Manufacturer B
167. Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1118. The Federal Circuit in Fantasy remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether kickers could receive "bonus
points" when scoring out of position. See id. at 1119 (noting Federal Circuit re-
manded case for further analysis of Commissioner.com product). The court indi-
cated that if the software package was programmed to allow "bonus points" to
kickers, then the Commissioner.com program would infringe Fantasy's patent. See
id. (illustrating holding based on further analysis of Commissioner.com product).
168. See High Tech, 49 F.3d at 1553 (citing facts of case).
169. See HARMON, supra note 52, at 378 (asserting without direct infringement,
alleged infringer not held liable for inducement).
170. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000) (defining inducement).
171. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to
encourage another's infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowl-
edge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement.").
172. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (showing advertising and instructing user how to use device to
infringe is proof of intent to induce infringement).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (requiring knowledge of infringement).
174. See id. (requiring active inducement).
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for contributory infringement. 175 The court, under a § 271 (c) anal-
ysis, must determine whether Manufacturer B sold Software Pro-
gram B knowing the program was "especially made or especially
adapted" for infringing use of a patent and without other substan-
tial non-infringing capabilities.1 76
Even if the court finds direct infringement, Manufacturer B
cannot be held to have contributorily infringed Manufacturer A's
patent.177 First, Manufacturer B did not know Software Program B
could infringe Software Program A's patent. 178 As stated in Pollock,
Manufacturer B must have knowledge that a device will infringe or
be used to infringe for a court to find contributory infringement. 179
Accordingly, because Manufacturer B did not know that Software
Program B could infringe Manufacturer A's patent, Manufacturer B
cannot be held to contributorily infringe the protected patent.180
Second, Software Program B is a staple article possessing non-in-
fringing capabilities."8 " Conversely, in Pollock, the Federal Circuit
determined the feedthroughs had only infringing capability and
were not staple articles of commerce.' 8 2 Therefore, because the
court could determine Software Program B to be a staple article of
commerce with non-infringing capability, Manufacturer B may not
be found to contributorily infringe the software patent.18 3
175. See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating contributory infringement requires showing of direct
infringement).
176. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
177. See id. (requiring knowledge of article made especially for infringing pat-
ent and item not staple article of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing
use).
178. See Snuba Int'l, Inc. v. Dolphin World, Inc., No. 99-1357, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16946, at *19 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2000) (requiring knowledge that device was
"especially adapted for a particular use proscribed by a known patent").
179. See Pollock v. Thunderline-Z, Inc., No. 98-1191, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
20883, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 1999) ("[Plaintiff] must show that [defendant]
'knew that the combination for which [its] components were especially made was
both patented and infringing."') (quoting Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 1170, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
180. See Snuba, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16946, at *19 (stating knowledge re-
quired to prove contributory infringement).
181. See Pollock, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20883, at *11-12 (commenting alleged
device need not be staple article of commerce to find contributory infringement).
182. See id. at *11-12 (finding feedthroughs have no other non-infringing
use).
183. See Snuba, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16946, at *20 (noting Dolphin Diver
pod not staple article because device had no non-infringing use). In this case,
Software Program B has a non-infringing use, its original use, and therefore is a
staple article of commerce. See 5CHISUM, supra note 45, § 17.03[3], at 17-61 to 17-
63 n.5-6 (defining staple article of commerce).
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IV. POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE "HARD CASE"
The impact of a judicial decision concerning whether artificial
intelligence should be considered pre-programming, thereby giving
a software program the capability to infringe, could have a wide-
spread effect on technological advancement in the software design
industry.1 8 4 Because the software and computer industries change
rapidly in both technology and scope, a twenty-year monopoly pro-
vided by a software patent, along with a ruling by a court that artifi-
cial intelligence programming infringes, could devastate software
and computer advancement utilizing artificial intelligence. 185 A
cessation in the development of artificial intelligence in software
and computers would undermine the fundamental goal of the
United States patent system. 186
A court's decision on whether the scenario between Manufac-
turer A and Manufacturer B is infringement, therefore, ultimately
affects the future use of artificial intelligence in computers and
software.' 8 7 If a court takes the position that products derived from
a user and artificial intelligence in a software program constitute a
capability already present in the program, then all programs utiliz-
ing artificial intelligence run the risk of incurring liability for direct
infringement. 188 Conceivably, all advanced programs with the abil-
ity to be manipulated based on the acts of the user and artificial
intelligence could infringe other protected patents.18 9 Under the
direct infringement analysis, only the capability of infringing use,
and not actual use, is necessary in establishing infringement, and
any patent holder could threaten suit against these device
manufacturers. 190
184. See Gleick, supra note 36, at 46 (suggesting allowance of patents for
software creates problems with trade). Because patents are allowed for software
applications, protection is given to those utilities against infringement. See 35
U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000) (defining direct infringement).
185. See Bajarin, supra note 36 (discussing rapid evolution of computer
industry).
186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also HILDRETH, supra note 45, at 2
(noting grant of patents encourages invention and disclosure). New products in-
troduced into society spark new development and interest in the area of the pat-
ented device. See id.
187. See § 271(a) (showing patent holder's right to exclude others from use).
188. See Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding computer program infringes if program has capa-
bility to infringe (i.e., if software program was programmed by manufacturer with
capability to infringe)).
189. See § 271 (a) (enumerating elements of direct infringement).
190. See Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832
(finding accused device need only be capable of operating in infringing manner);
see also Fantasy, 287 F.3d at 1119 (remanding to determine if software program has
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The threat of an infringement suit could cause irreparable
harm to the advancement of artificial intelligence in computers and
software. Inventors and manufacturers, fearful of infringement
suits based on their development and manufacture of products in-
corporating artificial intelligence, may stop their advancement of
artificial intelligence, thus countering the fundamental goals of pat-
ent protection. 191
Conversely, if a court determines that using artificial intelli-
gence to create an infringing product is a mere manipulation of the
software, then manufacturers will not be held liable for direct in-
fringement. 192 Inventors and manufacturers of artificially intelli-
gent software will then be free to continue their development and
production, thus conforming with the original goals of the patent
protection theory.193 There still may be harm, however, because
advanced software may consequently injure holders of patented
software applications through infringement.19 4 Injury to the patent
holders after receiving patent protection also violates the original
intent of providing patents: protection from infringement.195
This perceived weakening of patent protection, which was cre-
ated to safeguard intellectual property, would threaten future de-
capability to infringe). Note, Manufacturer A will not likely proceed with a suit
against User C because cost of litigation would far exceed the amount recoverable
from a user, i.e. no "deep pockets."
191. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (indicating original intent of founders);
see also HILDRETH, supra note 45, at 2 (declaring protection of inventions through
patents promotes additional discovery and invention by spawning improved and
extended ideas); Lemos, supra note 36 (commenting patents on software only
harm by chilling progression in software industry). Conceivably, artificially intelli-
gent software may be barred completely because, due to the recent approval of
software patents, there will always be new software capable of being infringed upon
by another piece of software.
192. See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49
F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding manipulation of device to infringe is not
infringement); see also Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Linvatec Corp., 299 F.3d 1378, 1382-
83 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (applying High Tech analysis); Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234
F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reviewing High Tech holding).
193. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31
(1945) (stating purpose of United States patent system is to promote advancement
in sciences); see also Greenfield, supra note 45, at 1057 ("[T]he ultimate goal of the
patent system is to bring new ... technologies into the public domain through
disclosure.") (alteration in original) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)).
194. See § 271 (a) (indicating manufacture, sale, or use of infringing device
infringes patent).
195. See HARMON, supra note 52, at 7-8 (discussing rights of patent holders
and laws of intellectual property).
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velopment and efficiency throughout the software industry. 196
Possible injury to the advancement of artificial intelligence or injury
to the patent holder invites a renewed inquiry into whether patent
protection should be afforded to software. 197 Consequently, future
advancement of artificial intelligence in software and computers
poses potential problems with both developers of artificially intelli-
gent devices and those who own patents. The potential implica-
tions of a judicial decision concerning artificial intelligence and
infringement go well beyond the fantasy football field.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's infringement analysis of computer pro-
grams containing artificial intelligence will transform either the
computer industry and/or future views of the USPTO regarding
patent infringement in software applications.198 In light of future
artificial intelligence applications and the significant influence of
software technologies, a decision that destroys or even disrupts a
portion of the computer industry will likely lead to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 199 With the intent of our
Founding Fathers in mind, a decision allowing use of artificial intel-
ligence to infringe may be the only practical way to adhere to the
principles of the United States Constitution in promoting the ad-
vancement of technology.200
EricJ. Schaal
196. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180
(7th Cir. 1991) (stating nation's future depends on efficiency of industry (capital-
ism) and protection of intellectual property).
197. See Gleick, supra note 36, at 49 ("The great bursts of technological inno-
vation of the past two decades.., took place in a free-wheeling and competitive
climate .... The greatest successes, like Microsoft and America Online, had noth-
ing to do with patent protection. Amazon did not need patents to grow.., to its
current pre-eminence.").
198. For a discussion concerning the impact of a court's decision on the
"Hard Case," see supra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000) (explaining rules of review for United States
Supreme Court).
200. See Creation, supra note 44 (reviewing history of United States patent
system).
[Vol. 11: p. 173
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol11/iss1/6
